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This article examines the negative impact that heightened
global economic competition is likely to have on the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration's' (OSHA) ability to promulgate
health standards that protect employees from exposure to toxic
substances in the workplace. Growing threats to regulated U.S.
industries from foreign competition under free trade will likely
impose added constraints on OSHA in fulfilling one of its primary
functions: the promulgation of permanent health standards under
Section 6(b) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act.2 The recent
ratification and implementation of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFrA)3 will only heighten U.S. industry vulnerability
to low-cost imports. Consequently, threatened industries will have
added incentive to challenge, or at least delay, any new health
standards in order to keep costs down so as to remain competitive in
the U.S. market. Moreover, the revised General Agreement on
* The author is a 1995 graduate of the University at Buffalo School of Law, and
wishes to thank Lucinda Odell Lapoff for her assistance in preparing this article.
'The Occupational Safety and Health Administration authorizes the Secretary
of Labor to promulgate occupational safety and health standards under the
authority of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-
678 (1988).
2 29 U.S.C. § 655(b).
3 103 Pub.L.No.103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
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Tariffs and Trade (GATT), that has been approved by the U.S.
Congress, will further heighten global competition.4 GATT currently
includes no international standards regarding worker rights.'
Both NAFTA and GATT will exacerbate the currently
existing pressures on many U.S. industries to cut costs, or relocate, in
order to remain competitive with foreign-based businesses located in
countries with few protective laws and regulations. One of the costs
of doing business in the United States is compliance with federal, and
state, worker safety laws and regulations. Free trade, however, will
threaten the viability of certain U.S. industries, particularly those that
must comply with government-imposed regulations protecting worker
health and safety. Paradoxically, such competition may also further
constrain OSHA's already difficult task of promulgating standards
dealing with "toxic materials" under Section 6(b)(5).6
I. WHY ARE HEALTH STANDARDS IMPORTANT?
Health standards promulgated under section 6(b)(5) provide
OSHA with its main weapon for protecting employees from the
adverse health effects of long-term exposure to carcinogens and other
4 James T. Madore, Congress Likely to OK GAT: UB Professor sees no
repeat of Battle over NAFTA, BUFF. NEws, Mar. 16, 1994 at B5 (GATT affects
117 countries and will lower trade barriers between the U.S. and Europe. In
addition, some firms fear that it may create the potential for floods of cheap
imports from products manufactured in lesser developed, Third-World
countries).
I Jerry Zremski, House Panel Sees Flaws in New World Trade Pact, BUFF.
NEws, April 27, 1994, at D3 (discussing hearings on the implications of GATr
on U.S. labor and environmental standards before the House of Representatives'
Small Business Committee).
6 The Act requires that " ... the Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing
with toxic materials or harmful physical agents.., set the standard which most
adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available
evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or
functional capacity..." 29 U.S.C. § 655(b).
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toxic materials. These standards are particularly important as
preventive measures because state worker's compensation schemes
are patently inadequate in compensating workers for wage losses and
medical expenses caused by the onset of latent occupational diseases.7
In fact, it is estimated that "only five percent of those severely
disabled from an occupational disease receive worker's compensation
benefits."'8  Therefore, the prevention of occupational diseases,
through the promulgation and enforcement of health standards, is an
extremely important approach. Health standards protect U.S. workers
in a proactive way because they prevent the occupational exposures
that can lead to the onset of latent diseases.
All employers covered by the OSH Act have a general duty to
"furnish to each of their employees employment and a place of
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing
or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm... ."9 Moreover,
Congress has stipulated that the promulgation of safety and health
standards, as defined in Section 3(8), will require employers to
maintain certain conditions or adopt work practices "reasonably
necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment...
.,,10 Section 6(b)(5) further delineates OSHA's authority to create
standards regulating employee exposure to toxic substances whereby
OSHA "shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the
7 Charles C. Caldart, Are Workers Adequately Compensatedfor Injury
Resulting from Exposure to Toxic Substances? An Overview of Worker
Compensation and Suits in Tort, CHEICAL SAFETY REGULATION AND
C0MLIANCE 92 (Homburger & Marquis eds., 1985) reprinted in NICHOLAS A.
AsH-ORD & CHARLES C. CALDART, TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE WORKING
ENVIRONMENT 463-465 (1991).
8 NICHOLAS A. AsHFoRD & CHARLEs C. CALDART, TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND
THE WORKNG ENVIRONMENT 463 (1991).
9 29 U.S.C. § 654. The OSH Act requires all employers engaged in interstate
commerce to comply with OSHA's standards. Id. at § 652(5). The term
"employer" does not include any federal, state or local government. Id
0 29 U.S.C.§ 652 (part of the definition of "occupational safety and health
standard" within the OSH Act).
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extentfeasible,.., that no employee will suffer material impairment
of health.... .,"
OSHA's "feasibility" requirement has been interpreted to
include both technological and economic feasibility. 2 A standard is
economically feasible if its costs neither threaten the competitive
structure of an entire industry, nor render it unable to compete with
imports or substitute products.13 Both NAFTA and GATT will
increase pressure on U.S. industry to keep costs down in order to
remain competitive. Consequently, future health standards may be
more difficult to promulgate in light of the pressing need for U.S.
industry to remain internationally competitive.
II. CONSTRAINTS ON OSHA RULEMAKING
Despite a broad mandate "to assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working
conditions,"' 4 OSHA has been somewhat of a disappointment,
particularly in its promulgation of health standards."5  OSHA's
standard setting process has been exceedingly slow-paced. In fact,
" 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (emphasis added).
'
2 American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490,509-531
(1981) (holding that the feasibility requirement precludes the Secretary of Labor
from having to engage in formal cost-benefit analysis); see also discussion infra,
pp. 135-36.
13 Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467,481 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); see also, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v.
Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
1429 U.S.C. § 651 (Congressional findings and purpose).
15See THoMAs 0. McGAnrry & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE
FAILED PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
13-14 (1993) (asserting that OSHA's most important role may be to prevent




between 1972 and 1988, OSHA promulgated only 24 permanent
health standards regulating employee exposure to chemical
substances.1 This is a woefully inadequate number, given "that there
are approximately 2000 suspected or known carcinogens in use in the
workplace."' 7
OSHA must overcome numerous practical, political, statutory
and judicial obstacles in its effort to promulgate health standards that
legitimately protect U.S. workers from exposure to toxic chemicals."i
For example, OSHA is responsible for making complex scientific,
engineering and policy judgments at the frontiers of human
knowledge.' 9 OSHA lacks the authority to license businesses or their
products, unlike other federal agencies, and it encounters "regulated
industries with strong economic incentives to delay regulation. 0 0
Furthermore, OSHA must utilize time consuming "hybrid"
rulemaking procedures in which interested parties are entitled to
appear and cross-examine key witnesses at public hearings.2 '
In the judicial context, the agency carries the unusual burden
of defending its rationale for specific final standards based on
"substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole."2
Significantly, the substantial evidence test that burdens OSHA in its
decisionmaking process has enabled interested parties to challenge
16 AsHFORD, supra note 8, at 100 (these figures include final rules and
rulemaking initiated as of June 7, 1988).
17 CHARLS NOBLE, LIBERALiSM AT WORK: THE RISE AND FALL OF OSHA
179 (1986).
" See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA:
Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reforn, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1-12 (1989).
19 Id. at 4-5.
" Id. at 6.
21Id. at 9 & n. 45-47.
22 29 U.S.C. § 655(f).
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the validity of most final standards in the courts.' Standards
therefore invariably take several years to become finalized, only to be
tied up for additional years while courts review substantive and
procedural challenges to the rulemaking in pre-enforcement actions
under section 6(f). 2
A. BENZENE AND SIGNIFICANT RISK
OSHA encountered a major setback in its ability to protect the
health of U.S. workers when the United States Supreme Court
decided Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institute'(Benzene). In Benzene, a plurality of the
Supreme Court held that in promulgating any permanent health
standard, OSHA must prove, as a threshold matter, that workers are
faced with a "significant risk," based on the best available evidence.2 6
The Benzene decision significantly undercut OSHA's ability to
promulgate health standards, particularly in light of its need to
support all decisionmaking under the substantial evidence test.27 As
a direct result of the Benzene decision, OSHA had to withdraw one
of its most innovative and far-reaching final rules.28 The required
I In the most recent example, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
remanded for OSHA's redetermination a September 1992 final standard
governing occupational exposure to cadmium on grounds that OSHA failed to
present substantial evidence that the permissible exposure limit was
"technologically and economically feasible for the dry color formulator industry.
... " Color Pigments Mfrs. Ass'n., Inc. v. OSHA, 16 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 1994).
2id.
25 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
6 Id. at 657.
7 See, e.g., MCGARrrY, supra note 15, at 55-57.
See id. at 52-55 & n. 63. The "Generic Cancer Policy" was one of the more
ambitious rulemaking efforts ever carried out by any agency. The proposed rule
established four categories of workplace chemicals. Category I substances would
be presumed to be carcinogenic and OSHA would then be authorized to issue an
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preliminary determination of significant risk continues to frustrate
OSHA's attempts to regulate employee exposure to suspected
carcinogens, since scientific knowledge about the long-term effects
of low-level exposure to many carcinogens is limited.
B. COTTON DUST AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Soon after the Benzene decision, OSHA won a reprieve of
sorts in American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan
29(Cotton Dust). In this case, representatives of the cotton industry
challenged the validity of OSHA's cotton dust standard.3" At issue
was whether OSHA was required to engage in a formal, cost-benefit
analysis in determining whether any proposed reduction of a
significant risk to worker health is "reasonably necessary" within the
meaning of Section 3(8)'s definition of health and safety standards.3'
In Cotton Dust, the Supreme Court held that, in promulgating
health standards under section 6(b)(5), OSHA is not required to
determine whether the costs of a permanent standard bear a
reasonable relationship to its benefits.32 The Court reasoned that the
"emergency temporary standard." Industry would then have the opportunity to
rebut the presumption during subsequent rulemaking. This policy never went
into effect due to the Benzene decision. Id.
29 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
30 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043 (1994) (setting a permissible exposure limit (PEL)
of 0.2 mg. of cotton dust per cubic meter for yam manufacturers; 0.750 mgJm3
for slashing and weaving operations; and 0.5 mg/m3 for all other processes in the
cotton industry); see also, Kathleen McKeon, Recent Development, 12 ENVTL.
L. 505 (1982) (discussing the history and background of the Cotton Dust
decision).
31 Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 504-508; see also, supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
32 452 U.S. at 512-13.
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statute requires feasibility, not cost-benefit analysis. 3 The majority
further held that OSHA's final cotton dust standard was
"economically feasible" because OSIA had validly determined that
the costs of compliance "were well within the financial capability of
the covered industries."34 The Court did not, however, "decide... the
question whether a standard that threatens the long-term profitability
and competitiveness of an industry is 'feasible' within the meaning of
Section 6(b)(5) of the Act .... 35
C. LEAD AND FEASIBILITY
A more thorough analysis of the meaning of "feasibility" was
conducted by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Marshall and Bingham
(Lead).36 Chief Judge J. Skelly Wright's analysis of the statute's
"economic feasibility" requirement provides a strong basis for
industry to argue that future health standards are economically
33id.
34 Id. at 530-31 n.55 (citing Secretary of Labor's reasoning in 43 Fed. Reg.
27, 379 (1978)).
35 452 U.S. at 530-31(referring to 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5)); see also, supra
note 12 and accompanying text.
36 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981)
(holding that OSIIA presented substantial evidence for the technological and
economic feasibility of the lead standard for certain industries, including primary
lead smelting, battery manufacturing, and printing but failed to present
substantial evidence or adequate reasons to support the feasibility of this
standard for other industries, including nonferrous foundries, auto manufacture,
pottery, paint spraying, and secondary scrap lead processors). See also,
MCGARrTY, supra note 15, at 1570 (discussing the complicated events following
issuance of a supplemental lead standard by the outgoing Carter Administration,
its subsequent suspension by President Reagan, and the events surrounding the
petition for review by the Supreme Court).
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infeasible, in light of intense foreign competition.37
In the Lead decision, Chief Judge Wright observed that:
The peculiar problem of reviewing the rules of
agencies like OSHA lies in applying the substantial
evidence test to regulations which are essentially
legislative and rooted in inferences from complex
scientific and factual data, and which often necessarily
involve highly speculative projections of
technological development in areas wholly lacking in
scientific and economic certainty.38
Nevertheless, he determined that a reviewing court need only
ensure that OSHA rationally explains the logic behind its reasoning
and "policies underlying any legislative choice. . .01 The court
ultimately found nothing wrong with OSHA's procedural conduct!'
The bulk of the court's analysis in the Lead decision focused
on the meaning of economic feasibility under section 6(b)(5). This
analysis was required to resolve a charge by industry groups that
OSHA had improperly deleted language in its final rule that "industry
need only install those engineering controls that are 'feasible."'4
OSHA claimed in its brief that it had proven the general feasibility of
the lead standard and had simply revised the final rule to prevent
individual employers from raising the issue of the infeasibility of
compliance in subsequent enforcement hearings.42 The final lead
-1 See discussion infra pp. 142-45.
3 647 F.2d at 1206-1207.
39 Id. at 1207.
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standard allowed for several levels of empoyer compliance methods.
First employers were required to attempt engineering and work
practice controls to meet the permissible exposure limit (PEL); if
such controls were insufficient, employers had to furnish respirators
as a supplement 3
The final lead standard therefore created a "strong general
presumption of the feasibility of meeting the PEL [permissible
exposure limit] without reliance on respirators"' and put added
emphasis on the primary use of engineering and work practice
controls 5 Engineering and work practice controls can be expensive
and are usually preferred by unions as the only realistic method of
protecting workers.' Industry, on the other hand, usually argues that
personal protective devices are more cost-effective and therefore
preferable, particularly when other methods are deemed too costly.47
Judge Wright identified, however, a logical flaw of
"circularity" in any court's analysis as to whether a standard is
technologically or economically feasible." He noted that "[w]e
cannot know if a standard is feasible until we know exactly what it
expects of employers,"49 and to the extent that the standard or the
regulatory scheme provides for flexibility in compliance, a court
43 See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(e)(1)(i)(stating that where engineering and
work practice controls cannot sufficiently reduce exposur below the PEL, "the
employer shall nonetheless use them to reduce expsures to the lowest feasible
level and shall supplement them by the use of respiratory protection...
4 Id.
45Id.
' See MCGArry, supra note 15, at 72-74; see also NOBLE, supra note 17, at
223.
47 See MCGARrY, supra note 15, at 72-74; see also NOBLE, supra note 17,
at 222.
41 Lead, 647 F.2d at 1267-1268.
49 Id. at 1267.
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would be more likely to agree that the standard is feasible5
Furthermore, Judge Wright noted that most of OSHA's earlier health
standards had created a hierarchy among means of compliance. Thus
employers could protect employees by the use of personal protective
devices as a last resort and when no other preferred means were
proven feasible!' This practice "built the very concept of feasibility
into the standard."52 Consequently, employers could not simply assert
during rulemaking, or in pre-enforcement review, that engineering
controls were technologically or economically infeasible unless they
provided substantial evidence in the record 3
As for economic feasibility in particular, the court stated that
"OSHA must construct a reasonable estimate of compliance costs and
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that these costs will not threaten
the existence or competitive structure of an industry, even if it does
portend disaster for some marginal firms."54 Additionally, the court
stated that "OSHA can revise any gloomy forecast that estimated
costs will imperil an industry by allowing for the industry's
demonstrated ability to pass through costs to consumers." 55
Therefore, "in pre-enforcement review the court would not expect
OSHA to prove the standard certainly feasible for all firms at all
times in all jobs. [B]ut it would have to justify the presumption, and
the attendant shift in burden, with reasonable technological and
economic evidence and analysis."56
Under this analytical framework, courts can conduct "a
50 Id. at 1267-69.
51 Id. at 1269-70.
52 Id. at 1269.
0 Id. at 1269-70.
S4 Id. at 1272.
55 Id. at 1267 (citing AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 671 (D.C. Cir.
1979)).
-6 Id. at 1270.
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preliminary test of feasibility on any pre-enforcement challenge to the
rulemaking" with a court reserving the opportunity to "test
feasibility again later-in reviewing denial of a temporary variance or
. . . in judicial review of an enforcement proceeding" where the
employer would have the burden of proof. 8 This feasibility analysis
has thwarted industry groups from tying up OSHA's rulemaking.
Nevertheless, there is currently major occupational safety and health
reform legislation in Congress that will alter one of its underlying
assumptions by preventing industry from raising the feasibility issue
in enforcement proceedings.
V. CONGRESSIONAL REFORM
Congress recently considered the first comprehensive reform
package for the OSH Act since its original passage in 1970.11
Senators Kennedy and Metzenbaum recently reintroduced a bill to
amend the Act.' The bill would greatly expand OSHA's
jurisdiction.61 It would extend coverage to public sector employees62
and almost all construction workers 3 The bill would aso require
many employers to form labor-management safety committees.' The
reform package appeared to go very far in its effort to better equip
5 Id.
58 Id.
-9 139 CONG. REC. S2779-02 (statement of Sen. Kennedy and complete text
of S. 575, 103d Cong., 21st Sess. (1993)).
60Id.
6 S. 575, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.(1993); H.R. 1280, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993).
6 Id. at § 301 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1988)).
63Id. at § 1201 (amending 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq. (1988)).
Id. at § 27 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1988)).
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OSHA, and employees themselves, in the quest for safer working
environments.
Nevertheless, one of its minor changes would have seriously
impeded OSHA's already difficult task of promulgating health
standards in light of the feasibility analysis in the Lead decision.65
The bill would have amended section 6(f) 66 by adding the following
new sentence: "The procedures under this subsection shall be the
exclusive means of challenging the validity of any occupational safety
or health standard and the validity of any such standard may not be
raised in an enforcement action under section 10 or 11."'67
At first blush, the additional language appears to offer a bonus
for employees by preventing industry from raising infeasibility as a
defense to OSHA compliance enforcement actions. The proposed
clause, however, removes the built-in flexibility of the statute. In
fact, the new language eviscerates Judge Wrighfs analytical
resolution of the circularity problem as discussed in the Lead case.6"
Congress might have thus unwittingly made it more difficult for
OSHA to promulgate permanent health standards by removing
industry's capability to raise the feasibility issue in enforcement
proceedings.
It is now highly unlikely that the reform bill will be passed
because the primary sponsors do not have the power to get the bill out
of committee, much less for a vote on the floor.69 If, however, the bill
remains intact and ultimately becomes law, reviewing courts will be
' See discussion supra pp. 136-40.
66 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1988) (providing that interested parties may petition
forjudicial review of the validity of final standards).
' S. 575, 103d Cong. 1st Session (1994); § 401(e) (amending 29 U.S.C.
655(f)).
" See discussion supra p. 10.
69 Dan Balz, A Historic Republican Triumph: GOP Captures Congress; Party
Controls Both Houses for First Time Since '50's, WASH. PosT, November 9,
1994, at Al (commenting on the Republicans' capture of both the Senate and
House of Representatives, effective January 4, 1995, after nationwide elections).
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forced to engage in higher scrutiny of OSHA's underlying rationale
for its determination of the general economic feasibility of any
standard during pre-enforcement challenges to its rulemaking.
OSHA's burden of proving the general feasibility of a standard would
be raised because reviewing courts would not be able to reserve
judgment on individual employers later. This higher burden would
provide industry groups added incentive to contest feasibility
throughout the entire rulemaking; and OSHA will be further
constrained in its efforts to effectively protect workers from exposure
to toxic substances.
Irrespective of any congressional reform of the Act, the
growing liberalization of international trade and commerce will exert
pressure on U.S.-based industry to cut costs in order to remain
competitive in the U.S. marketplace. Both NAFTA and GATT will
allow under-regulated foreign industries virtually free access to the
U.S. marketplace. Therefore, there can no longer be a strong
presumption that U.S. industry can readily pass on the costs of
compliance to consumers. OSHA will have a difficult task proving
the economic feasibility of stringent health standards when affected
U.S. industries are threatened by foreign competitors who can
effectively combine the benefits of free trade with the competitive
advantages derived from less demanding regulations.
IV. FREE TRADE
The liberalization of international trade and increasing global
economic competition will further constrain OSHAs ability to prove
the general economic feasibility of future health standards. U.S.
industry now continually competes with low-cost imports.
Productivity and competitiveness in the international market means
cutting costs wherever possible. One area that may be considered
expendable is employee safety and health. Free trade will exacerbate
the situation by making it virtually impossible for U.S. industry to
pass the costs of compliance on to consumers. Before NAFTA was
passed, there were a number of reasons that liberalization of trade
with Mexico and Canada would benefit the U.S. economy, and
134 VOL. M[V
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businesses in particular, in the long run.70 Nevertheless, during
debate before congressional committees prior to enactment,
representatives from organized labor groups expressed concern that
passage of NAFTA would serve not only to lower wages in the
United States, but also would enable U.S. companies to relocate their
operations in Mexico to take advantage of lower wage structures. 7'
Job losses were thus the major focus of labor's objections. Also of
concern was NAFTA's effect on already lax enforcement of
environmental and worker safety laws by the Mexican government,
which would seek to maintain a competitive advantage vis-a-vis the
United States and Canada. Congressional critics of NAFrA felt that
the agreement "should alter the market by forcing Mexico to adopt
policies supporting higher wages ...raising worker safety and
requiring environmental standards of industry."73
In fact, some commentators argued that "[t]he only way to
raise, [sic] standards in Mexico and improve practices in that country
was to force Mexican companies to comply with U.S. standards as a
quid pro quo for the access to the U.S. market granted by the
NAFTA. 74 Essentially, the argument was that since higher labor
standards act as a barrier to trade, the U.S. must either lower
standards at home or seek to improve standards in Mexico.7s The
Bush administration's response to these concerns included negotiating
" See generally Shellyn G. McCaffrey, North American Free Trade and
Labor Issues: Accomplishments and Challenges, 10 HoFsTRA LAB. LU. 449
(1993) (written by Deputy Under Secretary for International Affairs, U.S.
Department of Labor, Bush Administration).
71 Id.
72id.
73 Thomas Edsall, NAFTA Debate Reopens Wounds In the Body of the
Democratic Party: Arguments Pit Traditional Coalition, Centrists in Battle for
Soul, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1993, at A4.
74McCaffrey, supra note 70, at 465 (citation omitted).
75d.
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for safeguards against sudden surges in imports, providing for
dislocated worker assistance and retraining, encouraging cooperation
between the U.S. and Mexico on labor issues, and initiating "parallel
track" negotiations on worker safety and environmental issues.
7 6
The "parallel track" negotiations are arguably one of the
weakest strategies for protecting the safety of U.S. workers. Despite
the existence of solid Mexican worker safety laws,7 serious
enforcement problems78 are likely to persist into the foreseeable
future. Pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding on labor
matters signed on May 3, 1991 by the Secretaries of Labor from both
countries,)79 the U.S. and Mexico agreed that representatives from
OSHA and its Mexican counterpart would jointly analyze and study
a wide variety of worker safety issues. In addition, they would
engage in jointly sponsored seminars and allow for extensive
technical assistance by OSHA, including training on safety and health
inspection and enforcement."0
These agreements were extensive and wide-reaching efforts
to provide "guidance" to Mexican bureaucrats. They may indeed
have played an important role. Nevertheless, the reality is that
enforcement of worker standards in Mexico continues to be lax and
there now exists only cooperative joint "advisory" groups on worker
safety enforcement and training." Permissive enforcement of
standards by the Mexican government will likely continue into the
foreseeable future. In fact, there currently are no penalties provided
in NAFTA for any Mexican-made products created under sub-
76 See id. at 466-69.
'1 See id. at 469 and accompanying notes 83 and 84, citing portions of the
Mexican constitution and federal labor law.
78 Id.
71 Id at 474 and accompanying notes.
' See id. at 474-75 and accompanying notes.
8' Trade Pact's Cooperative Projects to Include Workplace Safety, Training,
23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) at 1431 (March 30, 1994).
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standard health and safety standards.8 2
Consequently many U.S. industries must now compete for
sales to U.S. consumers with cheaper products manufactured in
Mexico. The Mexican-made products with the best competitive
advantage in the U.S. marketplace will be those that are most labor
intensive (to take advantage of wage differentials), and the ones that
are most dangerous to worker health and safety or the environment.
U.S. workers in these industries are precisely those in need of the
most protection through promulgation of health standards, yet their
employers also face the stiffest competition and will likely be able to
successfully argue economic infeasibility in light of foreign
competition.
Some might argue that, in the international marketplace, these
are the kinds of jobs that U.S. workers do not need; that we should
just retrain them for other jobs in the new global economy. 3 Despite
that rationale, most U.S. workers will likely prefer to keep their
current jobs, particularly if they hold unionized manufacturing jobs
that pay well. They may, in fact, be willing to trade less demanding
health and safety protection for job protection.
This is a very complex policy dilemma now confronting U.S.
workers, their employers, and OSHA. Increased liberalization of
world trade may allow for higher profits for U.S. firms that currently
export their products to more markets. Nevertheless, they will be
competing with companies choosing to locate their manufacturing
operations in countries with lax safety and environmental standards
and low wage structures. Consequently, as U.S. safety regulations
increasingly become financially burdensome, smart U.S. corporate
managers and executives with their eyes on profits will undoubtedly
see the benefit of relocating in countries like Mexico. Such moves
will be particularly appealing when there are no trade barriers to the
U.S. market.
12 Pub.L.No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
'3 EdsaI, supra note 73.
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VI. SOLUTIONS?
The situation now faced by OSHA, Congress and U.S.
workers is analogous to that currently faced by individual states in the
context of workers' compensation. Currently, each state has an
individual worker's compensation scheme.'s In setting rates of
compensation, states must consider whether their statutory schemes
will deter industry from locating within their boundaries. Thus, states
with more liberal compensation schemes risk being at a competitive
disadvantage in attracting industry. This situation has had the effect
of chilling reform and has prompted calls for federalizing workers'
compensation to ensure fairness and equity. 5
Immediate solutions to the negative implications of free-trade
for worker safety and health standards are not readily apparent. They
are also beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, Congress, as
well as the governments of other industrialized nations, will need to
focus on creating international safety and environmental standards to
accompany future free-trade agreements. Otherwise, the playing field
will continue to tilt against those countries with tough, but expensive,
environmental and labor standards. Such negotiations would,
however, be extremely complicated and enforcement of such
standards would likely vary. There are also many contingencies and
countervailing policy arguments for and against attaching any
conditions to free trade.
There appear to be few short-term solutions to the problem of
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis varying environmental and labor
standards within a free-trade context. One possible solution would be
to make trade less "free" for those countries with inadequate
standards. Otherwise, the more dangerous and labor intensive jobs
will naturally flow towards those countries. Workers unlucky enough
to have those jobs will have to wait many years before their organized
ASHFORD, supra note 8, at 453.
8 See, e.g., Kenneth Matheny, Achieving Safer Workplaces by Expanding




efforts can raise standards to a level on par with the "industrialized"
world.
CONCLUSION
The world has changed rapidly since the OSHA Act was
passed in 1970. There is a new economic order and a move towards
the liberalization of trade. This trend provides U.S. industry with new
weapons to undermine the health of U.S. workers given OSHA's need
to prove "economic feasibility."8 6 In addition, while recent reform
legislation considered by Congress is quite comprehensive and long
overdue, 7 if enacted it would have constrained OSHA's ability to
promulgate stringent health standards.88
One of the reasons that Congress placed the cost of health
standards on all covered employers was to prevent conscientious
employers from suffering a competitive disadvantage from investing
in occupational safety and health. 9 The approach was particularly
important since occupational illness often manifests itself long after
the period of chronic exposure. Consequently, without regulation,
employers would have no economic incentive, such as a reduction of
workers' compensation costs, to protect workers because employers
would seldom be required to pay for the consequences of their own
neglect.90
This is precisely the situation now confronted by regulated
86See discussion supra pp. 136-40.
7 See generally Safety & Health: OSHA '94: Seeking Redefined Mission,
Revitalization ofExisting Authorities, Daily Lab. R. (BNA), No. 9, at D24 (Jan.
13, 1994).
11 See discussion supra p. 140.
89 See United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Marshall and
Bingham, 647 F.2d 1189, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing remarks of Senator
Yarborough).
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U.S. industries vis-a-vis foreign competitors within the free trade
paradigm. Because many U.S. industries are heavily regulated, their
higher compliance costs will hamper efforts to compete with rival
products from less regulated competitors under free trade, particularly
those produced in developing nations such as Mexico. These
developments will further constrain OSHA in protecting workers
from toxic substances, particularly in light of heightened international
competition.
The world has also changed dramatically since the Lead
decision. Judge Skelly Wright's "resolution" of the circularity
problem regarding economic feasibility under 6(b)(5) rulemaking
made sense in 1980. Nevertheless, the ability of American industry
to thrive in the next century will be based upon its international
competitiveness. -Consumers will happily pay lower prices for
comparable goods manufactured in countries with less exacting
worker safety standards. Consequently, Americans face a Hobson's
choice between less demanding worker safety standards or the loss of
jobs, and entire industries, because U.S. firms are now in position to
challenge most future health standards as economically infeasible.
All future standards will need to automatically build in feasibility
with personal protective devices, which are cheaper and less effective
than engineering and work practice controls.
Protecting U.S. workers from exposure to toxic chemicals
should always remain a very important goal. There is a moral
component to this proposition. Nevertheless, the risks of contracting
diseases are difficult to quantify and often manifest themselves only
after many years, even decades, of exposure. In addition, OSHA
faces numerous constraints in its ability to lower the chances that
employees will contract often preventable diseases. Protecting
workers from occupational illness can be quite expensive. If U.S.
industry is going to be forced by OSHA to implement costly
preventive measures, it will often find itself at a competitive
disadvantage in the international marketplace.
Consequently, economic feasibility will be much easier to
challenge because continued industry viability is now threatened by
the strains of increasing international competition. This is
particularly true after the passage of NAFTA and in light of the
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potential new GATr. Massive dislocation might increasingly be the
result of future safety regulation because American industry can no
longer effectively pass the compliance costs on to consumers. These
developments will have serious negative implications for the
continuing viability of OSHIA.

